halted decades of g r o w t h in t h e Winters Doctrine o f federal reserved rights; i t narrowed t h e purposes f o r which implicitly reserved water could be used.
T h e C o u r t r u l e d t h a t t h e Forest Service was entitled t o reserved r i g h t s o n l y for water needed t o secure "favorable conditions o f water flows" a n d "a continuous supply o f timber."
Water for other forest uses was t o b e allocated u n d e r state law. T h i s narrow reading o f t h e 1897 management a u t h o r i t y f o r forest reservations contrasts sharply w i t h virtually a l l i n t e r v e n i n g interpretations o f t h e Forest Service "Organic Act1' a n d w i t h the multiple use concept which has been evolving in Congress and administrative practice ever since.
A l t h o u g h t h e Forest Service has long supplied diverse p u b l i c services based o n t h e 1897 statute, t h e C o u r t decided t h a t timber production a n d watershed maintenance are t h e only purposes f o r which implied water r i g h t s e x i s t u n d e r t h e Winters Doctrine.
Water f o r l1secondary'l purposes must b e obtained by condemnation o r in competition w i t h other claimants u n d e r state law.
Hence, t h e Rio Mimbres decision appeared t o skew t h e management o f national forests away from t h e i r secondary purposes--recreation, fish, wildlife, range--by making water for them more expensive. B y reducing Forest Service r i g h t s t o t h e benefits t h u s produced, it may also discourage t h e management o f national forest vegetation t o improve the q u a n t i t y a n d timing o f r u n o f f f o r state water needs.
Appearances a r e r a r e l y informative guides t o federal-state interaction, however.
A l t h o u g h lawyers and judges may debate o r r e i n t e r p r e t t h e C o u r t ' s words, t h e effects o f t h e decision w i l l b e defined by Forest Service a n d state responses t o it. A n d agency actions a t b o t h levels o f government w i l l b e shaped by t h e larger political, economic a n d legal realities o f a dynamic federal system.
Every indication t h u s far i s t h a t t h e b i t t e r federal-state disputes t h a t have accompanied the federal r eserved r i g h t s doctrine t h r o u g h o u t t h i s c e n t u r y a r e yielding t o the pressures o f resource scarcities.
Behind the d u s t k i c k e d up by adversarial h a b i t a r e mutual interests in water a n d forest management t h a t neither state n o r federal government can a f f o r d t o ignore.
T
h e purpose o f t h i s article is t o explore how t h e Rio Mimbres decision w i l l atfect t h e management o f water o n t h e national forests.
T h e article has f i v e parts.
In t h e f i r s t , we review the rise and decline o f t h e federal reserved water right. In t h e second, we consider t h e possible effects o f t h e Kio Mimbres decision on national forest management.
In t h e third, we explore responses t o t h e decision.
In t h e fourth, we place these r esponses in t h e context o f general developments in federal-state relations.
Finally, we o f f e r as a conclusion an hypothesis about t h e f u t u r e governance a n d content o f national forest management in a n evolving federal system.
A l t h o u g h Forest Service responses t o t h e Rio Mimbres decision attempt t o recover the agency's a b i l i t y t o claim water, they create opport u n i t i e s f o r negotiated settlement o f federal-state differences a t a time when capacities f o r such negotiation a r e ready to respond t o them.
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The Rio Mimbres is appropriately viewed as a decision rtforll States' Rights. It reflects the adversarial mode o f the c o u r t system, which has heretofore dominated discussion o f reserved water r i g h t s .
B u t i t s effect i s t o move f u t u r e disputes from t h e c o u r t s t o t h e tables o f administrative negotiation.
T h e change i s l i k e l y t o increase r a t h e r t h a n reduce t h e Forest Service attention t o state water needs.
T h e Doctrine o f Federal Reserved Water R i g h t s a n d How It Grew
Relations between federal a n d state governments regarding management of western resources are chatiging f o r reasons which have n o t h i n g t o do w i t h federal reserved water r i g h t s .
However, the evolution o t IIWinters r i g h t s " o r "reserved rights," as t h e y are sometimes known, provides an interesting window t h r o u g h which t o view these changes.
There is a g r o w i n g tendency a t b o t h state a n d federal levels t o view management problems in terms o f mutual o r negotiable interests t h a t r e q u i r e coordiriated, j o i n t o r cooperative response. T h i s t r e n d i s p a r t i c u l a r l y noticeable in t h e tield o f o f federal reserved water r i g h t s because t h e historic p a t t e r n o f d i s p u t e resolution has been d i s t i n c t l y adversarial, b i t t e r and, n o t coincidentally, one-sided.
A l t h o u g h many r i v a l interests contend f o r t h e benefits o f water when federal reserved water r i g h t s a r e litigated, the c o u r t s approach t h e issue in terms o f a conflict between sovereigns: Whose law, t h e federal o r the state sovereign's, is controlling in t h i s situation? Substantively, the conflict has been viewed as a zero-sum game: What one sovereign ( o r i t s assigns) wins, t h e other loses.
In t h e water-scarce west, t h i s casting o f t h e issue has preordained i t s intensity.
The theoretical reach o f feaeral a u t h o r i t y generally, a n d o f federal a u t h o r i t y over t h e p u b l i c domain lands specifically, has expanded f o r much o f t h i s c e n t u r y (Kleppe v New Mexico, 426 U.S. 5 2 9 [ 1 9 7 6 ] ) .
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the theoretical reach of t h e reserved r i g h t s doctrine g r e w apace w i t h it, from n o t h i n g t o a conceivable stranglehold on state water r i g h t s .
T h e practical consequences contrast w i t h t h e theoretical possibilities and make t h e i n t e n s i t y o f t h e d i s p u t e more i n s t r u c t i v e . T h r o u g h o u t t h e prot r a c t e d legal debate, few have lost a state-granted r i g h t t o use water because o f a conflicting federal assertion o f reserved r i g h t s (Johnson, 1984;  Corker, 1 9 7 0 ) . T h i s fact may do more t o explain t h e bitterness than t o render it premature o r unreasonable: It underscores the contrast between t h e ill-defined federal reserved r i g h t s a n d t h e certainty-seeking state systems.
Federal reserved r i g h t s were ill-defined from t h i s inception because they developed in a series o f piecemeal responses t o changing federal land a n d water policy. U n t i l 1908, t h e assumption t h e federal government had "acquiescedll in evolving western state water law was an integral p a r t o f t h e more venerable expectation t h a t t h e federal government would dispose of i t s western t e r r i t o r i e s t o states a n d p r i v a t e holders.
These expectations are manifest in states l i k e Ohio, Kansas, Nebraska, Indiana, and Iowa, which were a l l carved from t h e p u b l i c domain in a relatively standard way (Gates, 1 9 6 8 ) . Such e a r l y p u b l i c domain states contain v e r y small percentages of land in federal ownership, and have n o issue w i t h the reserved water right. A t t h e turn o f the c e n t u r y , land retention replaced land disposal as t h e dominant federal policy for t h e remaining western p u b l i c domain. T h e Supreme C o u r t discovered a doctrine t h r o u g h which a federal reservation o f land implicitly reserved water t o accomplish t h e purposes o f t h e reservation without reliance upon state water law.
The doctrine of implied water reservations was f i r s t expressed in Winters v . U . S . , 207 U.S. 564 (1908) . T h e Supreme C o u r t held t h a t a n 1888 t r e a t y establishing an Indian reservation gave t h e Indians a superior right t o d i v e r t water from a stream than did a right g r a n t e d u n d e r state law p r i o r t o t h e reservation.
Although the t r e a t y did n o t mention water, t h e C o u r t concluded t h a t t h e land reservation had by implication reserved sufficient water t o accomplish the purposes for which the federal government had established it.
T h e Winters Doctrine raised three practical questions about the definition o f t h e reserved right. F i r s t , i s t h e doctrine an a r t i f a c t o f t h e federal governrnentls t r u s t relationship w i t h the tribes, o r does it attach t o non-Indian land reservations as well? Second, what are the purposes of reservation for which water may b e claimed? T h i r d , how should t h e amount o f water necessary t o achieve the purpose b e calculated? These questions were l e f t t o b e answered in d r i b s and d r a b s over t h e c e n t u r y .
T h e western states confidently a r g u e d t h a t only Indian reservations enjoyed reserved r i g h t s .
T h e i r position construed t h r e e statutes from 1866, 1870, a n d 1877 t o suggest t h a t t h e federal government waived i t s claims t o water appurtenant t o the federal lands and acquiesced in state allocation law.
In 1935, Justice Sutherland solidified t h i s "severance t h e o r y " in h i s decision in California Oregon Power Co. v . Portland Beaver Cement C o . , 295 U.S. 142 (1935) .l However, h i s ruling was o v e r t u r n e d in 1955 [ F P C v. Oregon 349 U.S. 435 ( 1 9 5 5 ) ] , when the C o u r t rejected state "ownership" o f water associated w i t h w i t h d r a w n federal larids and allowed a federally licensed project over state objections (Johnson, 1984) .
Arizona v . California 373 U.S. 546 (1963) dealt t h e state position a f u r t h e r blow. W i t h v i r t u a l l y no discussion, the C o u r t held t h a t the reservation doctrine applied t o non-Indian reserved lands.
Thus, a f t e r h a l f a c e n t u r y , the C o u r t had answered the f i r s t question raised by t h e Winters case: the Winters Doctrine obtained a n all, n o t j u s t Indian, land reservations.
The Forest Service subsequently departed from i t s longstanding policy o f filing f o r water claims in conformity w i t h state law a n d began asserting reserved r i g h t s claims t o meet i t s water needs.
Two questions from the Winters case remained unanswered: What a r e the purposes f o r w h i c h reserved r i g h t s can be claimed, a n d how should t h e appropriate q u a n t i t y o f water t o achieve them be determined? As these questions simmered o n t h e back b u r n e r r e g a r d i n g non-Indian land reservations, native American r i g h t s b u r s t t o the surface as a major p u b l i c issue.
Litigation expanding Indian water r i g h t s appeared t o considerably enhance t h e implied reservation concept as it applied t o the non-Indian reservations as well.
Numerous e f f o r t s in Congress a n d by various s t u d y commissions (see Johnson, pp. 5-9) failed t o rescind o r r e s t r i c t t h e reserved r i g h t s doctrine.
T h e C o u r t ' s partial, piecemeal and inconclusive holdings served p r i m a r i l y t o threaten state water systems w i t h open-ended a n d potentially conflicting allocations.
The fact t h a t paper, o r theoretical, r a t h e r t h a n wet water was a t issue did n o t make the planning o f water-related investments any easier for states o r holders o f state g r a n t e d r i g h t s . Moreover, Westerners confronted increasingly aggressive federal resource management; t h e reserved r i g h t s t h r e a t wa5 but one they perceived t o be lurking in t h e g r o w i n g federal commitment t o retention o f t h e remaining public domain.
It was disconcerting t o state officials and state water r i g h t s holders t o view t h e i r laboriously n u r t u r e d water systems going down t h e d r a i n in federal c o u r t d u r i n g a c e n t u r y of increasing judicial s u p p o r t f o r federal p r i o r i t i e s a n d of centralizing forces in politics a n d t h e economy.
Moreover, t h e paper n a t u r e o f the water arguably keep the issue in t h e piecemeal forum o f t h e courts.
Without real losers, there was l i t t l e incentive to force t h e issue i n t o a forum which was more conducive t o planning a n d negotiation.
B u t in a 1976 case concerning t h e Devil's Hole Pupfish, t h e C o u r t h i n t e d t h a t the expansion o f t h e doctrine might b e approaching an end.
In Cappaert v . U . S . , 425 U.S. 128 (1976) , it answered the Ilhow much wateroo question stingily, holding t h a t t h e federal government could claim o n l y enough water t o p r e v e n t " f r u s t r a t i n g o 1 achievement of t h e purpose for which t h e land reservation was made.2 T h e decision l e f t o n l y one question o f t h e initial t r i a d unanswered.
Two years later, in a 1978 adjudication o f t h e Gila River in New Mexico, t h e C o u r t acted decisively t o f u r t h e r limit the implied reservation doctrine.
In U . S . v . New Mexico 238 U.S. 696 (1978) . t h e Supreme C o u r t defined only two purposes for which t h e Forest Service could claim water.
Select i v e l y d i s t o r t i n g t h e h i s t o r y of t h e Forest Service's 1897 management authorization a n d several subsequent statutes (Fairfax & Tarlock, 1979; Tarlock & Fairfax, 1982) , t h e C o u r t identified timber supply and securing favorable conditions o f water flows as t h e only purposes f o r which water was implicitly reserved.
Al others were described as secondary a n d without a reserved right.
T h e C o u r t rejected Forest Service r i g h t s t o water from t h e Rio Mimbres for recreational a n d stockwatering purposes unless t h e State o f New Mexico chose t o p r o v i d e them, which it did not.
With t h e third question answered, t h e r e appeared t o b e the f i r s t loser o f wet water since Winters: t h e U.S. Forest Service.
T h e Rio Mimbres Decision: I t s Possible Effects on National Forest Management National forest planning t u r n s o n t h e relative values of o u t p u t s t h a t pieces of land a r e capable of p r o d u c i n g u n d e r d i f f e r e n t management regimes, as well as upon t h e relative costs o f implementing these regimes a t d i f f e r e n t intensities.
In allocating land t o d i f f e r e n t regimes, the Forest Service presumably uses values t h a t reflect i t s cost o f obtaining additional water a n d t h e benefit from t h e contribution t o i t s objectives t h a t additional water would make. Under a n expansive federal reserved right, t h e Forest Service valued water o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t downstream needs might impose political o r legal costs upon it. Water management services yielded o u t p u t s o f n o value t o the Forest Service, unless it used them itself, because it had n o institutional means f o r selling o r exchanging them. With a reserved right a n d without o p p o r t u n i t y t o sell o r exchange water services, t h e Forest Service had l i t t l e incentive t o p r o v i d e them a t the expense o f i t s o t h e r purpose^.^ Beyond i t s research endeavors in water y i e l d augmentation, it approached i t s responsibilities f o r water conditions as a custodian r a t h e r t h a n as a manager.
When the Kio Mimbres decision confined reserved (i.e., free a n d relat i v e l y ~n l i r n i t e d )~ water t o the purposes o f timber production and streamflow protection, it potentially increased t h e cost o f managing t h e national forests f o r o t h e r land uses t h a t need water.
111 the economic calculus o f national forest planning, t h i s would bend Forest Service allocations in favor o f timber production relative t o those uses t h a t depend upon a more limited a n d costly water supply.
As the Forest Service would have no apparent right t o additionat water produced by agency e f f o r t s , i t s interest in improved water s u p p l y would presumably diminish. Unless i t s b u d g e t o r state influence u p o n i t s choices were increased, t h e Forest Service would b e expected t o become more specialized in timber production, more concentrated in enclaves suitable f o r t h a t purpose, a n d less devoted t o managing forestlands f o r water s u p p l y a n d t h e f o r e s t recreation, fish, wildlife a n d r a n g e services t h a t r e q u i r e it.5 Potential state r e l a t i v e t o federal influence in t h e management o f nonenclave lands would increase, possibly sharpening distinctions between timber arid multiple use zones o f the national forests. B u t t h e Rio Mimbres decision created o t h e r tendencies as well.
B y closing t h e remaining open e n d o f t h e reserved r i g h t s d e f i n i t i o n , t h e decision increased Forest Service accountability t o t h e states f o r t h e water it uses.
T h e decision expanded b o t h t h e potential state influence u p o n national f o r e s t management a n d t h e potential federal t h r e a t o f w i t h d r a w i n g t h e multiple use services t h a t t h e states now f r e e l y enjoy.
In c i r c l i n g t h e r e s e r v e d right, t h e Supreme C o u r t increased t h e means by w h i c h t h e Forest Service a n d t h e states could impose t h e i r values o n one another. It increased t h e i r potential interdependence and, t h u s , t h e prospects f o r negotiatiori a n d exchange between them.
In t h e o r y , t h e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r exchange among holders o f p r o p e r t y is assumed t o advance t h e i r mutual i n t e r e s t (Pigou, 1920) .
I f right holders can g a i n from strengthened o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r negotiation a n d exchange, a n d i f arrangements t h a t maintain such o p p o r t u n i t i e s depend u p o n t h e i r s u p p o r t , t h e y w i l l s u p p o r t t h e necessary arrangements as long as t h e values a t stake justify t h e costs of doing so (Olson, 165; Demsetz, 1964) .
The h i g h e r t h e values a t stake, t h e g r e a t e r i s t h e readiness t o absorb these costs a n d t o accept t h e interdependence involved.
T h e g r e a t e r t h e e x i s t i n g interdependence, t h e lower a r e t h e additional costs t h s t must be justified.
A
n d t h e more open t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r exchange, t h e less t h e location o f p r o p e r t y r i g h t s affects outcomes (Coese, 1960).
Mutually acceptable arrangements replace adjudication as means f o r resolving d i f f e rences o f i n t e r e s t . T h i s presumably benefits a l l i n v o l v e d because t h e zero-sum consequences o f adjudication a r e p r c d u c t s o f i t s s t r u c t u r e r a t h e r t h a n o f t h e values a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h a t a r e potentially p r e s e n t in t h e situation it addresses.
These propositions suggest t h a t t h e effect o f a s h i f t in water r i g h t s depends on t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e values a t stake j u s t i f y new mutual relations t h a t a r e cooperative r a t h e r t h a n adversarial. T h e Rio Mimbres decision s h i f t e d water r i g h t s in a way t h a t may force the Forest Service t o internalize t h e state's costs o f water it h a d p r e v i o u s l y used free t o p r o v i d e services t h a t t h e states now freely obtain.
T h e states face a potential loss o f these riational forest services but can use t h e allocation o f water r i g h t s , o r financial a n d political p r o x i e s f o r them, t o avoid it.
T h e y possess added leverage t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e i r general capacities f o r resource management enable them t o serve national needs as well as t h e i r own. A n d the Forest Service possesses leverage t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t these state capacities depend u p o n i t s s u p p o r t .
If t h e values a t stake a r e sufficient, t h e n increased federal-state coordination would be expected.
Where it occurs, the Forest Service would d i v e r s i f y management o f t h e national forests in response t o g r e a t e r state influence a n d would increase i t s emphssis u p o n s e r v i n g state water neeas.
T h i s framework o f f e r s predictions about t h e impacts o f t h e Rio Mimbres decision o n national forest management.
In states where t h e values o f water a n d nontimber forest uses a r e generally high relative t o those for timber (e.g., in California a n d t h e central Rockies), federal-state coordination a n d t h e management o f national forests f o r water a n d water-based multiple uses w i l l i n t e n s i f y . Where t h e values o f water a r e high a n d those f o r nontimber uses a r e low r e l a t i v e t o timber p r o d u c t i o n (e.g., in t h e n o r t h e r n Rockies), t h e Forest Service a n d t h e states w i l l maintain o r increase t h e i r separateness a n d adversarial stance; national forest management w i l l become more specialized in timber p r o d u c t i o n a n d more concent r a t e d in areas p a r t i c u l a r l y suited f o r it. Where water i s abundant, t h e Fiio Mimbres decision w i l l n o t affect f o r e s t management, w h i c h w i l l continue t o emphasize multiple uses where values f o r them a r e high (e.g., in t h e Pacific N o r t h w e s t ) a n d timber p r o d u c t i o n where t h e y a r e low (e.g., in Alaska).
A n d t h e s t r o n g e r t h e state relative t o federal capacities in resource management, t h e lower a r e t h e water a n d multiple use values a t wtiich some level o f coordination w i l l develop.
In t h e n e x t sections, we explore responses to t h e Rio Mimbres decision t o find indications o f trends.
T h e r e s u l t s t e n d t o s u p p o r t o u r p r edictions.
hiore i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e y t e n d t o s u p p o r t t h e general hypothesis t h a t t h e Rio Mimbres decision is weakening t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between state a n d federal land a n d water r i g h t s a n d is encouraging a system o f cooperat i v e arrangements t h a t w i l l g r a d u a l l y replace t h e syndrome o f reliance u p o n t h e c o u r t s .
Forest Service Responses t o Rio Mimbres: Restoring Power While Creating O p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r Negotiation Since t h e Rio Mirnbres decision, t h e Forest Service has w o r k e d t o obtain r i g h t s u n d e r state law t o water t h a t it h a d been u s i n g f o r nontimber purposes o n t h e basis o f t h e federal r e s e r v e d r i g h t since Arizona V . California in 1963. T h e agency has also s o u g h t t o recover t h e federal water r i g h t s t h a t t h e Rio Mimbres w i t h d r e w .
It has t h u s f a r used f o u r d i s t i n c t i v e strategies t o d o so (Romm & Bartolani (1985) discuss these strategies in g r e a t e r d e t a i l ) .
A l l f o u r have been applied only in regions where t h e values o f water a n d multiple uses a r e generally high r e l a t i v e t o those f o r timber p r o d u c t i o n .
A l t h o u g h t h e f o u r appear a t f i r s t glance designed t o maximize t h e water w h i c h t h e agency could control, t h e i r implications a r e b r o a d e r t h a n that.
T h r e e o f t h e f o u r create new opport u n i t i e s t o r negotiation a n d exchange w i t h state interests.
T h e Hydrological A r g u m e n t In t h e Rocky Mountain states, t h e Forest Service has used a h y d r ological argument to e x p a n d t h e amount o f water attached t o t h e C o u r t ' s n a r r o w i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e 1897 Organic Act.
Because t h e Rio Mimbres decision denied reserved r i g h t s t o instream uses o f water f o r fisheries, aesthetic o r recreation purposes, t h e Forest Service i s q u a n t i f y i n g t h e amount o f water needed t o "secure favorable conditions o f water flow" f o r which claims can b e made (Hill, 1982) .
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validate t h e relationship between levels o f instream flow a n d qualities o f f o r e s t drainage systems, h y d r o l o g i s t s have estimated t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f tlows o v e r t h e y e a r t h a t would maintain t h e e x i s t i n g condition o f stream channels.6 T h e amount o f water t h a t i s r e q u i r e d t o p r e v e n t a decline in t h e drainage capacities o f several basins (Rosgen & Silvey, 1983) 
p r o v i d e s t h e basis f o r claims o f instream flows u n d e r federal r e s e r v e d water r i g h t s .
T h e Forest Service tested t h i s hydrological approach in t h e 1982 adjudication o f Wyoming's B i g H o r n R i v e r , where it estimated t h a t about 78 p e r c e n t o f average annual water yields were necessary f o r maintenance o f t h e drainage system (Rosgen & Silvey, 1983) .
f t e r several months o f negotiation w i t h t h e State o f Wyoming, t h e agency settled i t s claims o u t ot c o u r t f o r 2 5 p e r c e n t o f t h e amount o f water t h a t it had claimed. Confident t h a t a n improved v e r s i o n of t h e same approach w i l l w i t h s t a n d legal s c r u t in y , t h e agency is t e s t i n g it in adjudications o f t h e Rio Grande R i v e r (Rio
Crande National Forest) a n d t h e Arkansas R i v e r (Pike a n d San Isabel National Forests) in Colorado. T h e hydrological argument i s designed t o p r o t e c t , a n d may even enhance, t h e Forest Service's position in t r a d i t i o n a l adversarial water allocation procedures, B u t a l t h o u g h t h i s has been i t s p r i m a r y purpose, i t s potential i s n o t limited t o expanding t h e Forest Service's r e s e r v e d water r i g h t s a n d it may have utility outside t h e judicial arena.
For example, it also defines a mutually accepted physical s t a n d a r d t h a t states could e p p l y separately t o r e s t r i c t upstream Forest Service activities w h i c h modify t h e s t r u c t u r e a n d capacity o f stream channels.
A state could use t h e same s t a n d a r d t o define mandatory b e s t management practices f o r water q u a l i t y programs, w h i c h apply t o nonpoint sources o f pollution o n federal as well as p r i v a t e lands.
A n d i f states accept t h e p r i n c i p l e f o r federal lands, they would seem more l i k e l y t o apply it as well t o p r i v a t e lands t h a t have p u b l i c watershed value.
T h u s , t h e Forest Service's hydrological argument could t i g h t e n t h e weave between i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r national f o r e s t management a n d state water q u a l i t y regulation a n d could lead t o diminished j u r i s d i ctional End i n s t i t u t i o n a l differences between them. 
Riparian R i g h t s
T h e Forest Service has p u r s u e d a second s t r a t e g y in California, where state law recognizes " r i p a r i a n u n d e r w h i c h p r o p e r t y owners can make reasonable use o f water t h a t flows t h r o u g h o r adjacent t o t h e i r lands.* T h e Forest Service a r g u e s t h a t nstional forest lands q u a l i f y for r i p a r i a n rights.' It has asserted r i p a r i a n r i g h t s in about 65 p e r c e n t of i t s California claims since Rio Mimbres.
T h e State Water Resources Control Board sought t o derail t h i s s t r a t e g y by rejecting Forest Service r i p a r i a n claims o n Hallett Creek (Plumas National Forest) a n d Roaring Creek (Shasta-Trinity National Forest). l o The State argues t h a t r i p a r i a n r i g h t s appl o n l y t o lands t h a t passed from t h e p u b l i c domain t o p r i v a t e ownership."
T h e Forest Service successfully appealed t h e Hallett Creek decision in State Superior C o u r t (Lassen C o u n t y S u p e r i o r C o u r t Case No. 16291) a n d gained a favorable judgement in June 1984.
Riparian r i g h t s have some advantages o v e r a l t e r n a t i v e entitlements. U n l i k e a p p r o p r i a t i v e r i g h t s t h e Forest Service could obtain u n d e r state law, t h e y d o n o t r e q u i r e a p e r m i t from t h e State Water Resources Control Board.
T h e y also p r o v i d e an advantage o v e r t h e n a r r o w l y i n t e r p r e t e d r e s e r v e d right o f t h e Rio Mimbres decision because t h e y can b e applied t o any use, as long as it i s llreasonablel' u n d e r state law. Nevertheless, t h e r i p a r i a n right i s g o v e r n e d by state law.
I f t h e Forest Service wins i t 5 poirit in t h e Hallett Creek case, i t would recover some o t the s e c u r i t y t h a t it lost in Rio Mimbres, but it would also become a p r o b a b l y significant p a r t y t o t h e give-and-take processes o f state water law development.
Regulation of Access
Despite t h e effects o f water allocations o n land management possibilities, t h e Forest Service does n o t consider water resource development in i t s national forest management plans. A s a third s t r a t e g y of response t o the Rio Mimbres decision, however, t h e Forest Service is t e s t i n g i t s a u t h o r i t y u n d e r t h e Federal Land Policy a n d 
FLPhrlA authorizes t h e Forest Service t o regulate p r i v a t e access t o water a n d o t h e r n a t u r a l r esources t o p r o t e c t environmental conditions w i t h i n national forest b o u n daries.
T h e p e r m i t a u t h o r i t y could allow the Forest Service b o t h t o expand i t s own water r i g h t s by c o n f i n i n g t h e scope o f o t h e r s a n d t o i n s u r e t h a t water developments conform w i t h i t s l a n d management plans. Small-scale h y d r o e l e c t r i c developments in t h e Pacific Coast states, a n d transmountain d i v e r s i o n s o f national forest water t o u r b a n areas in the Rocky Mountain states, a r e water p r o j e c t s t h a t r e q u i r e Forest Service special-use permits.
T h e agency has denied p e r m i t s f o r transmountain d i v e r s i o n s t h a t did n o t meet environmental standards.
I t s denials have n o t been challenged.
T h e Forest Service has also imposed conditions o n permits t h a t i t did g r a n t .
Except f o r one case i n v o l v i n g a wilderness area, a l l challenges t o Forest Service p e r m i t conditions have been settled o u t o f c o u r t w i t h t h e conditions i n t a c t .
However, t h e agency appears r e l u c t a n t t o challenge t h e Federal E n e r g y Regulatory Commission (FERC)
Tkie Forest Service exercises i t s p e r m i t authorities t h r o u g h negotiations w i t h state a n d federal agencies t h a t have related authorities (e.g., in water q u a l i t y , f i s h a n d wildlife, e n e r g y a n d p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s department) f o r t h e same projects. T h u s , i t s approach t o permits g o v e r n s i t s assignment o f influence.
It has t h u s f a r considered applications f o r permits o n a case-by-case basis. T h i s approach places t h e i n i t i a t i v e f o r water development a n d i t s l a n d management e f f e c t s w i t h t h e applicant r a t h e r t h a n t h e agency. i t makes it d i f f i c u l t t o assess t h e cumulative environmental a n d management implications o f i n d i v i d u a l projects.
I t also tends t o disperse the influence o f o t h e r agencies by limiting negotiations w i t h them t o t h e characteristics o f specific projects a n d sites.
In (Bartoloni, 1984) , where land management planning occurs. The decentralization increased t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t the p e r m i t s t r a t e g y f o r water deveiopment w i l l b e i n t e g r a t e d w i t h f o r e s t p l a n n i n g , f o r administrat i v e a n d b u d g e t a r y reasons i f f o r no others. e n t h e agency's c o n t r o l o f water use.
1984, t h e agency sought t o increase t h e efficiency o f i t s permit process by decentralizing p r i m a r y a u t h o r i t i e s f o r it from t h e Region t o t h e Forest level

It would allow t h e agency t o design p e r m i t strategies t h a t conform w i t h forest plans a n d d r a w u p o n whatever a u t h o r i t y t h e plans have o r may g a i n in t h e f u t u r e . It would also s h i f t t h e focus o f negotiations w i t h o t h e r
p e r m i t -g r a n t i n g agencies toward t h e forest p l a n as a whole a n d presumably increase t h e i r influence u p o n it.
Reserved R i g h t s f o r Recent Purposes o f t h e National Forests T h e f o u r t h Forest Service s t r a t e g y i s closest t o t h e familiar adversarial mode o f pre-Rio Mimbres water relations a n d apparently f a r t h e s t from c u r r e n t legal a u t h o r i t y : It seeks r e s e r v e d r i g h t s f o r purposes o f t h e national forests t h a t Congress a p p r o v e d in t h e Multiple-Use Sustained Yield
A c t o f 1960 (i.e., recreation, range, f i s h , a n d wildlife purposes). Those purposes were "aeclared t o b e supplemental t o ..
. t h e purposes f o r which t h e national forests were established as set f o r t h in t h e A c t o f June 4, 1897.'' In i t s Rio Mimbres decision, t h e Supreme C o u r t i n t e r p r e t e d t h e "supplemental" purposes t o b e 'Isecondary" a n d opined in n o n b i n d i n g dictu t h a t t h e y were n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e s e r v e d r i g h t s . Nevertheless, t h e Forest Service has f r e q u e n t l y claimed r e s e r v e d r i g h t s f o r them w i t h a p r i o r i t y date o f 1960, when t h e Multiple Use A c t passed. T h e Forest Service b r i e f f o r t h e 1982 adjudication o f Wyoming's B i g H o r n R i v e r claimed r e s e r v e d r i g h t s t o water f o r range, recreation, a n d Policy S t u d i e s
Review, November 1985, 5:2
Such i n t e g r a t i o n may s t r e n g t h -fish a n d w i l d l i f e against a n y a p p r o p r i a t i v e claims w i t h dates o f p r i o r i t y subsequent t o June 1 2 , 1960--the d a y t h a t Congress passed t h e Multiple Use A c t . A l t h o u g h t h e Colorado Supreme C o u r t r e l i e d on Rio Mimbres when it decided against such federal claims [ U . 5 . v . C i t y and County of Denver, 656 Pacific 2d 1 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ] , t h e Forest Service has continued t o press them in U t a h adjudications t h a t i n v o l v e f i v e national forests. Among t h e f o u r strategies o f Forest Service response t o t h e Kio Mimbres, t h i s is t h e o n l y one t h a t maintains t h e adversarial stance a n d does n o t d i r e c t l y create o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r negotiation o f forest water management arid use w i t h t h e states.
I t is t h e o n l y one t h a t has been applied uniformly a n d t h a t has n o t been designed f o r specific states w i t h high water a n d multiple use values.
h e o t h e r t h r e e have shaped instruments f o r water allocation t h a t b o t h federal a n d state governments can control; t h e y have placed these i n s t r u m e n t s in states t h a t appear t o have reason t o use them.
Romm & Fai r f a x : The Backwaters o f Federalism
T h e States: Emerging P a r i t y a n d Capacities f o r Negotiation
A l t h o u g h designed t o enhance i t s right t o f r e e water, Forest Service responses t o t h e Rio Mimbres decision have raised possibilities f o r negotiation a t a n auspicious moment. T h e c o n t e x t o f federal-state relations in w h i c h t h e responses will b e implemented d i f f e r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y from t h e period o f state h o s t i l i t y t o g r o w i n g federal dominance in w h i c h t h e res e r v e d r i g h t s d o c t r i n e developed. Whatever t h e a b s t r a c t merits o f t h e r e s e r v e d right may be, changes in t h e premises o f these relations have f r a y e d i t s mesh w i t h o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s o f n a t u r a l resource management. These changes a r e discussed in t h i s section u n d e r t h e heading o f t h r e e t r e n d s .
T h e States Have Developed Independent Natural Resource Policy, Planning a n d Regulatory Capacities F u t u r e Forest Service water policy w i l l proceed in t h e c o n t e x t o f new state-level assertiveness based in enhanced capacity a n d ambition.
T h e Federal government has carrot-and-sticked state n a t u r a l resources p r ograms f o r a good p a r t o f t h i s c e n t u r y (Ingram, 1 9 7 7 ) . One r e s u l t o f t h i s federal p r o d d i n g a n d investment is t h a t state governments, long t h e cause o f despair among analysts a n d citizens alike, a r e n o t generally r e g a r d e d as alternatives t o federal programs in many areas o f p u b l i c policy ( A C I R , 1981; Stenberg, 1 9 8 5 ) .
In f o r e s t r y , t h e g r o w t h o f federal assistance t o t h e states dates b a c k t o 1911 f o r f i r e protection, t o 1924 f o r t h e p r o v i s i o n
o f p l a n t i n g stock a n d state extension services, t o 1937 f o r afforestation subsidies, t o 1 9 4 0 f o r research, a n d t o 1974 f o r state forest resource p l a n n i n g a n d assessment.
Similar cooperative arrangements were initiated in flood c o n t r o l ( 1 9 3 6 ) , erosion c o n t r o l ( 1 9 3 7 ) , t h e abatement o f stream pollution (1948) , t h e development a n d enforcement o f state water q u a l i t y standards ( 1 9 6 5 ) , t h e maintenance of anadromous fisheries ( 1 9 6 5 ) , a n d t h e implementation o f p o i n t a n d nonpoint source pollution controls ( 1 9 7 2 ) .
A l t h o u g h long viewea as examples o f g r o w i n g federal control o v e r state b u d g e t s a n d p r i o r i t i e s , such pieces o f policy a n d programs coalesced in t h e 1970s as a v i r t u a l federal mandate t h a t states develop comprehensive state capacities t o p l a n a n d regulate t h e management o f forest a n d water resources.
In f o r e s t r y , f o r example, t h e 1978 Cooperative F o r e s t r y Assistance Act a n d i t s extensions created a v i s i o n a r y policy o f state f o r e s t r y a n d o f federal-state relations in f o r e s t r y t h a t i s likely t o have g r e a t e r historical importance t h a n i t s more-discussed c o u n t e r p a r t s o f t h e decade.
T h e Water Q u a l i t y A c t s of 1972 a n d 1977 have h a d p r o f o u n d effects o n state a n d local capacities t o regulate forest a n d land as well as water use a n d t o d o so w i t h i n federal as well as state a n d local j u r i s d i c t i o n s .
In many states, such developments have built p l a n n i n g a n d r e g u l a t o r y capacities t h a t a r e now p r e p a r e d t o assume t h e i n i t i a t i v e r a t h e r t h a n follow t h e c a r r o t .
In California, for example, t h e f i r s t State Forest Resource Assessment (California Department o f F o r e s t r y , 1979) was funded p r i m a r i l y by t h e federal government.
Nevertheless, it formed a s t r i k i n g l y d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f state f o r e s t r y conditions--specifically in i t s c h a p t e r o n water--than i s a p p a r e n t in analogous Forest Service p l a n n i n g documents, a n d a r g u e d t h e necessity for expanding state influence o n national forest policy a n d management.
Meanwhile, t h e California Forest Practice A c t o f 1973 h a d established t h e s t r o n g e s t system o f p r i v a t e f o r e s t r y regulation in t h e n a t i o n ( V a u x , 1 9 8 3 ) .
T h e Forest Taxation Reform A c t o f 1976 h a d created a 5 . 5 million-acre state zone o f p r i v a t e land t h a t was committed t o long-term f o r e s t r y (Romm & Washburn, 1 9 8 5 ) .
T h e Forest Improvement A c t created a state cost--share p r o g r a m f o r n o n i n d u s t r i a l f o r e s t r y investment, analogous t o but s t r o n g e r t h a n e x i s t i n g federal p r o g r a m (Romm e t al., 1 9 8 5 ) . A n a in 1984, t h e State Water Resources Control Board, possessing t h e a u t h o r i t y t o establish t h e b e s t management practices as standa r d s f o r managing nonpoint sources o f pollution o n p r i v a t e a n d federal forest lands, adopted t h e independent recommendations of t h e State Board o f F o r e s t r y a n d t h e Forest Service f o r t h e i r respective j u r i s d i c t i o n s : The state's water policy agency t h e r e b y emerged as a formal link between a n d a u t h o r i t y o v e r state a n d federal f o r e s t r y organizations a n d t h e i r standards o f f o r e s t management.
I f California's experience i l l u s t r a t e s o r p r e f i g u r e s developing potential in o t h e r states, it suggests t h a t t h e states have gained t h e a b i l i t y a n d motive t o serve national i n t e r e s t s in exchange f o r favorable national f o r e s t management policies w i t h i n t h e i r boundaries.
T h e Federa I Covernmen t is Decentralizing Responsi bi Ii ty f o r Public Services t o t h e States
A l t h o u g h t h e dominating reasons f o r it were political a n d fiscal, t h e age o f federal subsidies has, by empowering a n d s u p p o r t i n g t h e states, substantially reduced t h e inequities a n d weakness in state p u b l i c services t h a t h a d been used t o j u s t i f y heave federal involvement (Stenberg, 1985) . A n d since 1 9 8 1 , f o r o t h e r political a n d fiscal reasons, t h e federal government has b e g u n t o
w i t h d r a w from s u p p o r t o f state p u b l i c services t h a t it h a d l a r g e l y developed t h r o u g h t i e d assistance.
T h i s withdrawal has included t h e r e d u c t i o n o f federal s u p p o r t for a n d consequent leverage u p o n state f o r e s t r y programs (U.S. Forest Service, 1981-85) .
T h e t r a n s f e r o f responsibility t o t h e states has n o t y e t been matched 5y t h e t r a n s f e r o f a u t h o r i t y a n d financial i n s t r u m e n t s t h e y need tu p r o v i d e services t h e p u b l i c has come t o expect.
J u s t as Congress represented state i n t e r e s t s i n leading t h e development o f federal subsidization policies, t h e r e seems reasons t o expect t h a t it w i l l again assume leadership in t h e t r a n s f e r o f a u t h o r i t y a n d resources t h a t t h e states need t o fill t h e vacuum l e f t by federal r e t r e a t .
T h e federal lands a r e a n obvious focus f o r t h e exercise a n d development o f potential state a u t h o r i t y in t h e West ( Cowart e t al., 1 9 8 6 ) . While t h e i r d i v e s t i t u r e in s i g n i f i c a n t amounts i s u n l i k e l y , t h e g r o w i n g state p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e i r management i s a reality.
C u r r e n t state-federal conflicts o v e r t h e allocation o f f o r e s t a n d minerals revenues ( F a i r f a x & Yale, l 9 8 5 ) , about t h e states' r i g h t s t o participate in a n d challenge federal decisions ( T e x a s Oil and Gas Carp v . A r k l a Exploration C o . , 562 F.Supp. 1 2 1 4 W.C. A r k . 1983), a n d about t h e a p p r o p r i a t e relationships between federal resource management a n d state a n d local need (Granite Rock Co. v . California Coastal Commission, 590 F.Supp. 1361 [N.D.Cal. 198411 , indicate g r o w i n g p r e s s u r e s f o r t r a n s f e r o f a u t h o r i t y a n d responsibilities as well as resources ( F a i r f a x , 1985b) .
T h e Rio Mimbres decision, perhaps b e n i g h t e d in i t s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e 1897 A c t , h a d t h e effect o f maintaining in state hands t i t l e t o a potent i a l l y valuable a n d a r g u a b l y federal resource. However, t h e decision's real value t o t h e states depends o n t h e i r capacities t o c o n v e r t t h e water right i n t o a stream o f benefits t h a t s u p p o r t t h e i r p u b l i c programs. One possible means i s t o use t h e right as a lever o n t h e management o f t h e national forests in o r d e r t o e x t r a c t more o f t h e services which t h e states need. While decentralization b u i l d s incentives f o r i n f l u e n c i n g national f o r e s t management, a n d reduces federal abilities t o counteract them, t h e Rio Mimbres decision p r o v i d e s a potential tool w i t h w h i c h they can b e t r a n s l a te d i n t o tangible effect.
Romm & Fairfax: The Backwaters of Federalism
Realignment o f Political Constituencies is Expanding t h e Power Base f o r State a n d Local I n t e r e s t s in National Forest Management A realigning political environment w i l l shape water as a goal o f national forest management.
In t h e 1970s. t h e environmental movement, t h e clearc u t t i n g d i s p u t e a n d wilderness debates made national forest management a b r o a d p u b l i c issue.
Two major congressional enactments focused unpreced e n t e d a t t e n t i o n o n t h e Forest Service, increased i t s accountability t o a national public, a n d b r o u g h t t h e national forests u n d e r t h e full sway o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e l y -o r i e n t e d national policies o f t h e time.
When t h e Reagan administration assumed power, it did so w i t h t h e perception o f t h e national forests as a federal economic asset.
If managed " e f f i c i e n t l y , " t h e asset c o u l d prime t h e pump a n d fill t h e t r e a s u r y o n t h e basis o f p r o d u c t i v e r a t h e r t h a n fiscal powers; it could free p r i v a t e timber for e x p o r t a n d improve t h e balance o f trade. As a n a l t e r n a t i v e t o federal b o r r o w i n g against f u t u r e generations, it could even b e sold. Forest Service b u d g e t s f o r timber, minerals a n d land sales increased; b u d g e t f o r t h e u n p r i c e d services o f soil, water, a n d range management declined (U.S. Forest Service, 1981-85) .
T h e c r i t e r i o n o f "economic efficiency" gained t h e same ascendancy in national decisions as t h e c r i t e r i o n o f " e q u i t y " h a d h e l d in t h e p r e v i o u s decade.
A t t h e p r e s e n t time, i n d u s t r i a l timber associations a n d established environmental g r o u p s have clear access t o influence u p o n national Forest Service policies.
Despite t h e i r p u b l i c disagreements, t h e national leaders h i p o f b o t h have developed common interests a n d skills in t h e federal way o f doing business.
T h e y now share t h e same language o f I'efficiency" (Sample 1984; Roe, 1984) .
T h e y may even hold the same positions o n issues."
T h e y have developed a facility f o r negotiating w i t h t h e federal government, a n d w i t h one another, t h a t has strengthened t h e i r functional i d e n t i t y while separating them from t h e contemporary concerns o f t h e i r localized constituents.
In some areas, localized environmental a n d economic interests seem t o have moved towara one another as well.
T h e wood p r o d u c t s i n d u s t r y has always been a loose association o f highly competitive local a n d regional i n t e r e s t s t h a t join forces nationally only against a perceived common t h r e a t (Robbins, 1982) . Environmentalism a n d i t s legal consequences appeared t o u n i f y them in t h e '60s a n d '70s.
H a r d economic times have subsequently s p l i t them apart.
Local sawmills a r e increasingly threatened b y aemise o r absorption a n d increasingly separated from t h e interests t h a t t h e i r national centers o f presumed leadership represent. When federal timber p u r c h a s e r s in t h e West s o u g h t r e l i e f from c o n t r a c t s signed during t h e p r i c e boom o f the later 1970s, it separated them from t h e timberland holding segment o f t h e i n d u s t r y , a n d even from self-supplying divisions o f t h e i r own corporations, more deeply t h a n any o t h e r issue in t h e postwar era ( H o r n g r e n , 1 9 8 5 ) .
T h e environmental s t r e n g t h o f t h e 7 0 s d e r i v e d i n i t i a l l y from local a n d largely u r b a n organizations t h a t mobilized nationally t o promote federal c o n t r o l o v e r matters t h a t concerned them.
Environmental g r o u p s have now p r o l i f e r a t e d in forest-dependent communities a n d regions, where normal concerns for jobs a n d n e i g h b o r s a r e difticult t o separate from concern about t h e v i a b i l i t y of t h e local sawmill o r issues o f local control.
In a t least some California counties, these g r o u p s have rejected t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f national organizations in local issues in o r d e r t o avoid t h e polarization it was expected t o cause (MacNally & Hester, 1 9 8 5 ) .
Local environmental g r o u p s joined woods-a n d mill-workers' unions in a n i n d u s t r i a l s t r i k e against Louisiana Pacific's use o f f o r e s t herbicides, w h i c h was perceived as a t h r e a t by a d i s t a n t corporation t o local i n d u s t r i a l a n d environmental health (Mendocino News Service, 1 9 8 5 ) .
A n d they a n d t h e Linions have b e g u n t o discuss j o i n t e f f o r t s t o achieve a Caiifornia policy t h a t would regulate p r i v a t e timber h a r v e s t r s t e s o n a "sustained-yield" basis in o r d e r t o stabilize forest o u t p u t s a n d t h e communities depending upon them.
T h e horizontal s p l i t between local a n d national i n t e r e s t s appears t o be g a i n i n g political significance r e l a t
i v e t o t h e v e r t i c a l environmentdevelopment d i v i s i o n s t h a t dominated resource politics in t h e p r e c e d i n g decade.
Such s h i t t s a r e r e c u r r i n g phenomena in Arnerican politics. B u t t h e p r e s e n t one is o c c u r r i n g w i t h t h e f i r s t real r e t r e a t o f federal power since t h e national forests were created a n d a t a time when state capacities in resource management appear t o b e coming o f age.
While t h e phenomenon is r e c u r r e n t , this combination is new.
Political Flows a n d Water R i g h t s What d o these contextual t r e n d s suggest about t h e effects o f t h e Rio blimbres decision o n national forest management f o r water s u p p l y ? T h e decision created a potential i n s t r u m e n t f o r state influence u p o n national f o r e s t management.
I t also created a reason f o r federal withdrawal from t h e p r o v i s i o n o f nontimber benefits f o r the states.
It sowed these possibilities in t h e c o n t e x t o f a more general s h i f t in r e l a t i v e state a n d federal powers.
T h e states have increasing ( 1 ) capabilities a n d ambitions, ( 2 ) financial motive, a n d ( 3 ) local political s u p p o r t , t o more actively p l a n a n d r e g u l a t e f o r e s t management activities, i n c l u d i n g those o n t h e national forests.
T h e y a r e increasingly in a position t o impose t h e i r p r i o r i t i e s on national f o r e s t management decisions as well as t o promote t h e satisfaction o f national i n t e r e s t s o n p r i v a t e lands t h a t a r e w i t h i n t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n . The Forest Service has ( 1 ) declining b u d g e t s a n d s t a f f , ( 2 ) increasing motive t o shed o r share p e r i p h e r a l responsibilities, a n d ( 3 ) weakening coalitions o f " t r a d i t i o n a l " s u p p o r t f o r i t s programs.
It is losing t h e leverage on state programs t h a t i t once had, but i t retains t h e capacity t o c u r t a i l o r e x p a n d services. such as improved water s u p p l y , t h a t t h e states may desire.
In resource management, t h e feder6l a n d state governments a r e approaching a p a r i t y of power, capacity a n d dependence t h a t has n o t existed p r e v i o u s l y .
These circumstances a r e fruitful for the g r o w t h of negotiation anci exchange where t h e stakes a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y h i g h o n b o t h sides t o j u s t i f y t h e r e q u i r e d arrangements.
Forest Service responses t o t h e Rio Mimbres decision b o t h r e f l e c t a n d enhance t h e environment f o r negotiated r a t h e r t h a n adversarial settlement o f f o r e s t water issues between federsl a n d state governments.
T h e responses have developed where values a n d capacities a r e most l i k e l y t o promote interdependence.
They have taken forms t h a t o f f e r d i v e r s e precedents f o r application in states where t h e tendency t o w a r d interdependence would otherwise b e weaker.
I n seeking more secure water r i g h t s , t h e Forest Service has n u r t u r e d conditions in w h i c h t h e d i r e c t influence o f water r i g h t s o n national f o r e s t management seems l i k e l y t o diminish.
As a r e s u l t , t h e values t h a t t h e Forest Service applies t o water w i l l g r a d u a l l y approach those o f t h e states; i t s land management decisions w i l l increasingly r e f l e c t state water objectives. T h e Rio Evlimbres decision h a d two d i r e c t effects. F i r s t , it severely limited t h e federal r e s e r v e d right. It increased t h e potential cost of water t h e Forest Service r e q u i r e s t o manage i t s lands f o r uses o t h e r t h a n timber p r o d u c t i o n as well as t h e potential cost t h e states might i n c u r i f t h e Forest Service w i t h d r e w from managing f o r these uses.
It t h e n p r o v o k e d responses t h a t increase t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f federal-state negotiation a n d exchange f o r t h e management o f t h e national forests a n d t h e i r water s u p p l y .
T h e possible outcomes range from ( 1 ) Forest Service withdrawal t o timber enclaves, in w h i c h it i s e n t i t l e d t o a l l t h e water it can consume, t o ( 2 ) federal-state coordination o f f o r e s t policy, p l a n n i n g a n d management, in w h i c h r i s i n g state values for water s t r e n g t h e n multiple-use management o f t h e national forests.
Tendencies in b o t h directions a r e p r e s e n t l y apparent.
T h e y a r e l i k e l y t o b e manitest in d i f f e r e n t degrees, depending u p o n r e l a t i v e state values f o r t h e v a r i o u s f o r e s t uses, u p o n state capaci t i e s t o influence federal decisions a n d t o promote p r o d u c t i o n o f forest services or1 p r i v a t e land, a n d u p o n t h e national benefits t h a t such state a c t i v i t i e s can provide.
Forest Service responses t o t h e Rio Mimbres, a n d state capacities t o respond t o t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h a t these have created, suggest t o u s t h a t t h e dominant t r e n d w i l l b e toward modes o f coordination t h a t g r a d u a l l y i n t e g r a t e federal a n d state forest policy, p l a n n i n g a n d management. Beginning in California a n d t h e central Rockies, we expect t h e c i r c l i n g o f t h e r e s e r v e d right t o eventually spawn compacts a n d councils such as manage intergovernmental relations in cooperative f i r e protection. 13 AS such arrangements arise, t h e location o f boundaries a n d r i g h t s , a n d t h e adversarial relations associated w i t h them, w i l l lose importance in resource allocation, presumably t o t h e advantage o f b o t h parties. l4 T h e Rio Mimbres decision made b o t h levels o f government somewhat more aware o f t h e i r limits a n d t h e i r interdependence.
It i s one more closing o f t h e American f r o n t i e r .
As w i t h o t h e r such events, responses t o it w i l l t r a n s f o r m national forest water from a paper issue o f sovereignty t o a practical problem o f effectively managing what i s there, NOTES lI'If t h e A c t s o f 1866 ano 1879 did n o t constitute an e n t i r e abandonment o f t h e common-law r u l e o f running waters insofar as t h e p u b l i c lands a n d subsequent grantees thereof were concerned, t h e y foreshadowed t h e more positive declarations o f t h e Gesert Land Law o f 1877
[A111 s u r p l u s water over and above such actual appropriation and u s e , together with the water of all lakes, rivers and other sources of water supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights. [43 U . S . C . A . § 3211 " I f t h i s language i s t o b e g i v e n i t s n a t u r a l meaning .... it effected severence o f all waters u p o n t h e p u b l i c domain, n o t theretofore appropriated, from t h e l a n d i t s e l f .... T h e f a i r c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e p r o v i s i o n .. . i s t h a t Congress intended t o establish t h e r u l e t h a t f o r t h e f u t u r e t h e land should b e patented separately; a n d t h a t a l l non-navigable waters thereon should b e r e s e r v e d f o r t h e use o f t h e p u b l i c u n d e r t h e laws o f t h e states a n d t e r r i t o r i e s . . . . I1 * T h e Desert Hole National Monument was e x p l i c i t l y r e s e r v e d by presidential proclamation t o p r o t e c t t h e enuangered p u p f i s h i n h a b i t i n g i t s u n d e r g r o u n d pool. When pumping on a n adjacent r a n c h began t o lower t h e level of t h e pool, t h e C o u r t r u l e d t h a t t h e federal r e s e r v e d right superceded t h e state right t h a t t h e r a n c h e r s held, but t h a t " t h e level o f t h e pool may b e p e r m i t t e u t o d r o p t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e d r o p does n o t impair t h e scientific vaiue o f t h e pool as t h e n s t u r a l h a b i t a t o f t h e species sought t o b e p r e s e r v e d . 31n 1979, Californials national forests (Region 5) were u s i n g $5 p e r acre foot as t h e value o f f o r e s t water t o b e considered in t h e i r land management p l a n n i n g process.
T h e value has subsequently been raised t o $10, $41, and, in 1984, t o $56 p e r acre foot. Ewing (1985) a n d E u p h r a t (1985) have shown t h a t t h e marginal economic values o f f o r e s t water v a r y g r e a t l y w i t h location, r a n g i n g from zero t o almost $300 p e r acre foot, but average a t least twice t h e v a l u e t h a t t h e Forest Service c u r r e n t l y uses in California.
4 T h e r e s e r v e d right i s limited technically t o t h e amount o f water t h a t i s needed t o satisfy a federal p u r p o s e o f land reservation.
However, it places n o limit o n t h e ambitions w i t h w h i c h t h e p u r p o s e o f reservation i s p u r s u e d .
If t h e amount o f water t h a t i s necessary t o g r o w a unit of timber were q u a n t i f i e d , f o r example, t h e r e s e r v e d water right could be limited t o t h a t amount p e r unit o f timber g r o w n , but it would n o t limit t h e acreage in o r i n t e n s i t y o f timber p r o d u c t i o n , i.e., t h e total amount of water t h a t it secured f o r t h e purpose. 5 K r u t i l l a , Bowes a n d Sherman (1983) have demonstrated t h a t decisions about timber h a r v e s t regimes a r e sensitive t o differences in t h e assumed value o f water yields.
In general, t h e h i g h e r t h e value o f water yield, t h e s h o r t e r a r e t h e optimal timber rotations a n d t h e smaller a n d more numerous a r e t h e optimal h a r v e s t openings.
Because o f t h e potential reuse o f water t h r o u g h a series o f hydrogeneration plants, t h e value o f water i s Liirectly related t o t h e elevation o f i t s source where such facilities a r e available.
T h u s , t h e e f f e c t o f water value on timber management regimes becomes more pronounced a t h i g h e r elevations and, by supplementing t h e economic value o f h a r v e s t s where g r o w t h rates a r e low, tenas t o raise t h e elevational t h r e s h o l d o f economic harvest.
A g r i c u l t u r a l values of forest water depend u p o n t h e availability o f i n f r a s t r u c t u r e f o r storage a n d transp o r t (Ewing, 1985) . T h u s , forest management f o r water storage anti au5mlentation i s more l i k e l y t o occur in a g r i c u l t u r a l l y developed t h a n 2For example, b o t h want s t r o n g wilderness designations, one t o secure i t s d i r e c t i n t e r e s t s in wilderness, t h e o t h e r t o close access t o p r i c eb r e a k i n g supplies o f raw materials.
Robbins (1982) analyzes t h e h i s t o rically adversarial but symbiotic relationship between l a r g e r timber corporations a n d p r e s e r v a t i o n interests, viewing reduced availability o f federal timber as one means f o r g a i n i n g some i n d u s t r i a l concentration a n d c o n t r o l in a v e r y unstable m a r k e t (see also Romm, 1983; Fairfax. 1985a) . 13klalos a n d Bacon (7980) describe t h e highly developed i n t e r g o v e r nmental cooruination o f California's f i r e protection system. "Gn t h e recommendation o f tkie F i r e Chief of Los Angeles County, t h e California Department of Water Resources initiatea a council o f p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e owners, a n d federal, state a n d local agencies, t o cooperatively nianage almost 100,000 acres of land in t h e Lower Feather R i v e r Basin for improved water, range, a n d timber yields. A l t h o u g h t h e p r o j e c t has s u f f e r e d f o r b u d g e t a r y reasoris, t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l accomplishment was a significant b r e a k t h r o u g h . A s w i t h t h e elevenfold increase in Forest Service p l a n n i n g values f o r water in California, i t s occurrence a f t e r t h e Rio Mimbres decision was presumably coincidental.
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